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Kuwaiti National Security and the U.S.-Kuwaiti Strategic

Relationship After Saddam May 14 2022 The U.S.-Kuwaiti military and political relationship has been of considerable value to both countries since at least 1990. This alliance was formed in the aftermath of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's brutal invasion of Kuwait and the U.S. decision to free Kuwait with military force in 1991. Saddam's later defeat and removal from power in 2003 has ended an important rationale for the alliance, but a close look at current strategic realities in the Gulf suggests that Kuwait remains an important U.S. ally. It is also an ally that faces a number of serious national security concerns in the turbulent post-Saddam era. Problems with an assertive Iran, an unstable Iraq, and the continuing threat of terrorism will require both Kuwaitis and Americans to rethink and revise previous security approaches to meet the shared goals of reducing terrorism and regional instability.

Saudi Security Oct 19 2022 Events at the beginning of the 21st century have brought a fundamental change to the security environment in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of a significance not witnessed in the region since the Iranian Revolution in 1979. The fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003 eliminated the most significant external threat facing Saudi Arabia. At the same time, internal threats to the Kingdom appear to be increasing. The demographic and economic challenges facing the Kingdom are contributing to internal instability. Increased instances of political violence, particularly suicide bombings against targets within the Kingdom, have been carried out by terrorists linked to al-Qaeda. These attacks have targeted Westerners and, for the first time in May 2003, non-Saudi Muslims. This book examines the security challenges facing Saudi Arabia at the start of the 21st

century. It argues that while external threats to the Kingdom remain, the greater threat to security may lie within the Saudi state: the result of a failure to address current political realities. Major security challenges include the threat from Iran, economic and demographic pressures, the question of succession within the ruling al-Saud family and maintaining the U.S.-Saudi security partnership, a relationship which has endured over 50 years.

Iraq Apr 13 2002 Operation Iraqi Freedom overthrew Saddam Hussein's regime, but much of Iraq remains violent because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, compounded by Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence that, in the judgment of many, constitutes a "civil war." Mounting U.S. casualties and financial costs -- without dramatic improvements in levels of violence or clear movement toward national political reconciliation among Iraq's major communities -- have intensified a debate within the United States over whether to reduce U.S. involvement without completely accomplishing initial U.S. goals. President Bush announced a new strategy on January 10, 2007 ("New Way Forward") consisting of deployment of an additional 28,500 U.S. forces ("troop surge") to help stabilise Baghdad and restive Anbar Province. The strategy is intended to provide security conditions conducive to Iraqi government action on a series of key reconciliation initiatives that are viewed as "benchmarks" of political progress. The FY2007 supplemental appropriation, P.L. 110-28, linked some U.S. reconstruction aid to progress on the eighteen named benchmarks, but allows for a presidential waiver to continue the aid even if little or no progress is observed in Administration reports due July 15, 2007 and September 15, 2007. The latter will include a major assessment of the effects of

the "troop surge" to date. According to the required July 15, 2007 Administration report, released on July 12, the Baghdad security plan has made progress on several military indicators and some political indicators, but progress is unsatisfactory on the most important political reconciliation indicators. The Administration report asserts that the "overall trajectory... has begun to stabilise," a finding on the security situation that is corroborated, to some extent, by an August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate A required report by the GAO released September 4, 2007, assesses less progress on security benchmarks than does the Administration and is pessimistic, as is the NIE, on the prospects for political reconciliation. Some in Congress -- as well as the Iraq Study Group -- believe that the United States should begin winding down U.S. combat involvement in Iraq. Both chambers adopted a FY2007 supplemental appropriation to fund U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (H.R. 1591) that would have set an outside deadline of March 31, 2008, for U.S. combat withdrawal if the President did not certify Iraqi progress on the "benchmarks." President Bush vetoed it on May 1, 2007, and subsequent bills mandating forms of withdrawal or combat reduction have not moved forward. Some observers say such legislation might see further action after the Administration's September 15 progress report, while others say some positive assessments of the "troop surge" might forestall immediate congressional action. Iraq has not previously had experience with a democratic form of government, although parliamentary elections were held during the period of British rule under a League of Nations mandate (from 1920 until Iraq's independence in 1932), and the monarchy of the Sunni Muslim Hashemite

dynasty (1921-1958). The territory that is now Iraq was formed from three provinces of the Ottoman empire after British forces defeated the Ottomans in World War I and took control of the territory in 1918. Britain had tried to take Iraq from the Ottomans earlier in World War I but were defeated at Al Kut in 1916. Britain's presence in Iraq, which relied on Sunni Muslim Iraqis (as did the Ottoman administration), ran into repeated resistance, facing a major Shiite-led revolt in 1920 and a major anti-British uprising in 1941, during World War II. Iraq's first Hashemite king was Faysal bin Hussein, son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca who, advised by British officer T.E Lawrence ("Lawrence of Arabia"), led the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire during World War I. Faysal ruled Iraq as King Faysal I and was succeeded by his son, Ghazi, who was killed in a car accident in 1939. Ghazi was succeeded by his son, Faysal II, who was only four years old. A major figure under the British mandate and the monarchy was Nuri As-Said, a pro-British, pro-Hashemite Sunni Muslim who served as prime minister 14 times during 1930-1958. Faysal II, with the help of his pro-British Prime Minister Nuri al-Sa'id who had also served under his predecessors, ruled until the military coup of Abd al-Karim al-Qasim on July 14, 1958. Qasim was ousted in February 1963 by a Baath Party-military alliance. Since that same year, the Baath Party has ruled in Syria, although there was rivalry between the Syrian and Iraqi Baath regimes during Saddam's rule. The Baath Party was founded in the 1940s by Lebanese Christian philosopher Michel Aflaq as a socialist, pan-Arab movement, the aim of which was to reduce religious and sectarian schisms among Arabs. One of the Baath Party's allies in the February 1963 coup was Abd al-Salam al-

Arif. In November 1963, Arif purged the Baath, including Baathist Prime Minister (and military officer) Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, and instituted direct military rule. Arif was killed in a helicopter crash in 1966 and was replaced by his elder brother, Abd al-Rahim al-Arif, who ruled until the Baath Party coup of July 1968. Following the Baath seizure, Bakr returned to government as President of Iraq and Saddam Hussein, a civilian, became the second most powerful leader as Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council. In that position, Saddam developed overlapping security services to monitor loyalty among the population and within Iraq's institutions, including the military. On July 17, 1979, the aging al-Bakr resigned at Saddam's urging, and Saddam became President of Iraq. Under Saddam Hussein, secular Shiites held high party positions, but Sunnis, mostly from Saddam's home town of Tikrit, dominated the highest party and security positions. Saddam's regime repressed Iraq's Shiites after the February 1979 Islamic revolution in neighboring Iran partly because Iraq feared that Iraqi Shiite Islamist movements, emboldened by Iran, would try to establish an Iranian-style Islamic republic of Iraq.

Living Through the Post 9-11 Era Aug 25 2020 Learn how it felt to live through the 9-11 attacks and how America changed - for better and worse - in the years that followed. Includes a glossary, websites, and other resources.

The Report of the Iraq Inquiry Jan 10 2022 The key findings of the public inquiry into the handling of the 2003 Iraq war by the British government led by Tony Blair. Chaired by Sir John Chilcot, the Iraq Inquiry (known as there 'Chilcot Report') tackled: Saddam Hussein's threat to Britain the legal advice for

the invasion intelligence about weapons of mass destruction and planning for a post-conflict Iraq. This 60,000-word executive summary was published in July 2016. Philippe Sands QC wrote in the London Review of Books: 'It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate.' Published under an Open Government Licence, this book aims to make better known the findings of the Iraq Inquiry, which took seven years to complete at a cost of £10 million. The text, headings, footnotes and any emphasis are exactly those of the original document.

Contents Introduction Pre-conflict strategy and planning The UK decision to support US military action Why Iraq? Why now? The UK's relationship with the US Decision-making Advice on the legal basis for military action Weapons of mass destruction Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq The post-conflict period Occupation Transition Planning for withdrawal Did the UK achieve its objectives in Iraq? Key findings Lessons Timeline of events Reviews The Iraq Inquiry, chaired by Sir John Chilcot and composed of five privy councillors, finally published its report on the morning of 6 July, seven years and 21 days after it was established by Gordon Brown with a remit to look at the run-up to the conflict, the conflict itself and the reconstruction, so that we can learn lessons. It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate. — Philippe Sands, London Review of Books A more productive way to think of the Chilcot

report is as a tool to help us set agendas for renewed best efforts in creating more effective and accountable statecraft. Chilcot has confirmed that... we still do not have intelligent long-range planning by the armed forces in close and active cooperation with other government agencies, nor an adequate and integrated system for the collection and evaluation of intelligence information, nor do we have the highest possible quality and stature of personnel to lead us through these challenging times. — Derek B. Miller, The Guardian Although sceptics wondered how much more the very-long-awaited Report of the Iraq Inquiry by a committee chaired by Sir John Chilcot could tell us when it appeared at last in July, it proves to contain a wealth of evidence and acute criticism, the more weighty for its sober tone and for having the imprimatur of the official government publisher. In all, it is a further and devastating indictment not only of Tony Blair personally but of a whole apparatus of state and government, Cabinet, Parliament, armed forces, and, far from least, intelligence agencies. Among its conclusions the report says that there was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein; that the British chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted; that military action was not a last resort... — Geoffrey Wheatcroft, The New York Review of Books Ideal for any student of politics, diplomacy, or conflict.

U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era Jul 04 2021
During the post--World War II era, American foreign policy prominently featured direct U.S. military intervention in the Third World. Yet the cold war placed restraints on where and how Washington could intervene until the collapse of the former Soviet

Union removed many of the barriers to -- and ideological justifications for -- American intervention. Since the end of the cold war, the United States has completed several military interventions that may be guided by motives very different from those invoked before the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Likewise, such operations, now free from the threat of counterintervention by any other superpower, seem governed by a new set of rules. In this readily accessible study, political scientist Glenn J. Antizzo identifies fifteen factors critical to the success of contemporary U.S. military intervention and evaluates the likely efficacy of direct U.S. military involvement today -- when it will work, when it will not, and how to undertake such action in a manner that will bring rapid victory at an acceptable political cost. He lays out the preconditions that portend success, among them a clear and attainable goal; a mission that is neither for "peacekeeping" nor for "humanitarian aid within a war zone"; a strong probability the American public will support or at least be indifferent to the effort; a willingness to utilize ground forces if necessary; an operation limited in geographic scope; and a theater commander permitted discretion in the course of the operation. Antizzo then tests his abstract criteria by using real-world case studies of the most recent fully completed U.S. military interventions -- in Panama in 1989, Iraq in 1991, Somalia in 1992--94, and Kosovo in 1999 -- with Panama, Iraq, and Kosovo representing generally successful interventions and Somalia an unsuccessful one. Finally, he considers how the development of a "Somalia Syndrome" affected U.S. foreign policy and how the politics and practice of military intervention have continued to evolve since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, giving specific

attention to the current war in Afghanistan and the larger War on Terror. U.S. Military Intervention in the Post--Cold War Era exemplifies political science at its best: the positing of a hypothetical model followed by a close examination of relevant cases in an effort to provide meaningful insights for future American international policy.

State of Repression Nov 27 2020 A new account of modern Iraqi politics that overturns the conventional wisdom about its sectarian divisions How did Iraq become one of the most repressive dictatorships of the late twentieth century? The conventional wisdom about Iraq's modern political history is that the country was doomed by its diverse social fabric. But in State of Repression, Lisa Blaydes challenges this belief by showing that the country's breakdown was far from inevitable. At the same time, she offers a new way of understanding the behavior of other authoritarian regimes and their populations. Drawing on archival material captured from the headquarters of Saddam Hussein's ruling Ba'th Party in the wake of the 2003 US invasion, Blaydes illuminates the complexities of political life in Iraq, including why certain Iraqis chose to collaborate with the regime while others worked to undermine it. She demonstrates that, despite the Ba'thist regime's pretensions to political hegemony, its frequent reliance on collective punishment of various groups reinforced and cemented identity divisions. At the same time, a series of costly external shocks to the economy—resulting from fluctuations in oil prices and Iraq's war with Iran—weakened the capacity of the regime to monitor, co-opt, coerce, and control factions of Iraqi society. In addition to calling into question the common story of modern Iraqi politics, State of Repression offers

a new explanation of why and how dictators repress their people in ways that can inadvertently strengthen regime opponents.

Strategic Implications of Intercommunal Warfare in Iraq Oct 27 2020 In the post-Saddam era, differences among Iraqi ethnic and religious groups will either emerge as a barrier to political cooperation and national unity, or they will instead be mitigated as part of the struggle to define a new and more inclusive system of government. Should Iraqi ethnic and sectarian differences become unmanageable, a violent struggle for political power may ensue. This study does not predict an ethnic or sectarian civil war in Iraq except as a worst case, which must be analyzed and considered. If Iraqi violence erupts along religious/sectarian and ethnic lines, this conflict will have thunderous echoes throughout the area. Group identity, which is critical throughout much of the Middle East, will provide a compelling context for regional bystanders watching ethnic and sectarian bloodshed. Moreover, various nations would involve themselves in the fighting in ways up to and including the possibility of military intervention. Additionally, inter-communal harmony and tolerance in other regional states may suffer as the result of Iraqi fighting and the responses of neighboring governments to that fighting. The danger of an Iraqi civil war requires serious U.S. cooperation with those regional states that also have a stake in preventing this outcome.

Iraq and the Crimes of Aggressive War Aug 05 2021 This accessible account of the war in Iraq argues that US military actions constituted a criminal war of aggression.

Confronting Saddam Hussein Apr 01 2021 A vivid portrayal of what drove George W. Bush to invade Iraq in 2003--an outcome

*that was in no way predetermined. America's decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003 is arguably the most important foreign policy choice of the entire post-Cold War era. Nearly two decades after the event, it remains central to understanding current international politics and US foreign relations. In *Confronting Saddam Hussein*, the eminent historian of US foreign policy Melvyn P. Leffler analyzes why the US chose war and who was most responsible for the decision. Employing a unique set of personal interviews with dozens of top officials and declassified American and British documents, Leffler vividly portrays the emotions and anxieties that shaped the thinking of the president after the shocking events of 9/11. He shows how fear, hubris, and power influenced Bush's approach to Saddam Hussein's Iraq. At the core of Leffler's account is his compelling portrait of Saddam Hussein. Rather than stressing Bush's preoccupation with promoting freedom or democracy, Leffler emphasizes Hussein's brutality, opportunism, and unpredictability and illuminates how the Iraqi dictator's record of aggression and intransigence haunted the president and influenced his calculations. Bush was not eager for war, and the decision to invade Iraq was not a fait accompli. Yet the president was convinced that only by practicing coercive diplomacy and threatening force could he alter Hussein's defiance, a view shared by British Prime Minister Tony Blair and other leaders around the world, including Hans Blix, the chief UN inspector. Throughout, Leffler highlights the harrowing anxieties surrounding the decision-making process after the devastating attack on 9/11 and explains the roles of contingency, agency, rationality, and emotion. As the book unfolds, Bush's centrality becomes more and more evident, as*

does the bureaucratic dysfunctionality that contributed to the disastrous occupation of Iraq. A compelling reassessment of George W. Bush's intervention in Iraq, Confronting Saddam Hussein provides a provocative reinterpretation of the most important international event of the 21st century.

The Struggle for Kirkuk May 22 2020 An eyewitness account of mid-century Iraq that reveals the deep-seated tensions that existed before and after the reign of Saddam Hussein.

The US Approach to the Islamic World in Post-9/11 Era Jun 22 2020 This book examines the United States' foreign policies toward the Muslim world?including actions taken against Islamic countries who attempted to challenge the United States' regional dominance; and alliances with Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. It focuses on how the U.S/ has reconfigured its policy towards the radical and the conservative group of Muslim countries and how its new mission against terrorism has affected international relations, particularly U.S.-Indian relations. Islamic revivalism, the emergence of a highly political Islamic population, the rise of terrorism, and other recent socio-political changes are also discussed.

World Disorders Feb 17 2020 (ACADEMIC PAPERBACK DESCRIPTION) Long one of the field's most distinguished thinkers, Hoffmann brings together in this volume his important recent work on international politics. Many published here for the first time, these essays offer incisive reflections upon the reemergence of nationalism and ethnic conflicts in Europe, the redefined role of military intervention, and other uncertainties brought on by the demise of the Cold War. New to this edition is a current analysis of the Kosovo conflict. Woven throughout are his

clear-eyed assessments of contending approaches to the study of international relations. (LONG TRADE CLOTH) Stanley Hoffmann has remarked that OIt wasnOt I who chose to study world politics. World politics forced themselves upon me.O A rootless child of World War II; Austrian, French, and later American, he has always maintained a unique balance and perspective on global affairs. Long one of the fieldOs most distinguished thinkers, Hoffmann brings together in this volume his important recent work on international politics. Many published here for the first time, these essays offer incisive reflections upon the reemergence of nationalism and ethnic conflicts in Europe, the redefined role of military intervention, and other uncertainties brought on by the demise of the Cold War. Hoffmann weighs the influence on theory and policy of such disparate figures as John Rawls, Hedley Bull, and George Schultz. Woven throughout are his clear-eyed assessments of contending approaches to the study of international relations.

Understanding the Middle East Oct 15 2019 Explore the history of conflict in the Middle East, from ancient times to today's headlines. Take a balanced but unflinching look at: The warring civilizations of the ancient Middle East..The early expansion of Islam...What most textbooks don't tell you about the Crusades...Wars between Israel and its Arab neighbors...The Israeli-Palestinian conflict...Why religion and politics are intertwined in the Middle East...How Iran became an Islamic Republic...Iraq from ancient times to the post-Saddam era...How Bin Laden became a radical.and then a terrorist...Islamist terror beyond the Middle East...and much, much more

Kuwaiti National Security and the U.S.-Kuwaiti Strategic

Relationship After Saddam Jun 03 2021 The U.S.-Kuwait military relationship has been of considerable value to both countries since at least 1990. This alliance was formed in the aftermath of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's brutal invasion of Kuwait and the U.S. decision to free Kuwait with military force in 1991. Saddam's later defeat and removal from power in 2003 eliminated an important rationale for the alliance, but a close look at current strategic realities in the Gulf suggests that Kuwait remains an important U.S. ally. It is also an ally that faces a number of serious national security concerns in the turbulent post-Saddam era. Since its independence in 1961, Kuwait has struggled to manage a number of difficult challenges related to protecting its citizens and its territory from the predatory designs of large and dangerous neighbors. The most menacing neighbors have been Iraq and Iran. While Iran has proven a threatening and subversive enemy on key occasions, Iraq is even more problematic. Kuwait has maintained a long and often extremely difficult relationship with Iraq, and a series of Iraqi governments have either pressured Kuwait for territorial concessions or suggested that Kuwait is a lost province of Iraq. Kuwait also must cope with a newly empowered Iran which has at least partially filled the Gulf power vacuum created by Iraq's political crisis. Good Kuwaiti relations with Iran are often viewed with favor by significant elements of Kuwait's Shiite community. Nevertheless, the Kuwaiti leadership fears Iranian interest in domination of the Gulf and is especially opposed to Iranian efforts to compel the United States to withdraw its military forces from the region. The United States also has a vested interest in regional political reform and ongoing democratization in Kuwait. Beyond being a

valuable strategic ally, Kuwait also has shown a commitment to expanding democracy in an evolutionary way that supports U.S. aspirations for both stability and more inclusive government within the region.

Tyranny's Ally Jan 30 2021 The 1991 Persian Gulf War was the greatest direct military investment the United States has ever made in the Middle East. The objective was to remove Saddam Hussein as a threat to the region. Seven years after the war, Saddam's regime remains in place, his power is rising, his diplomatic situation is steadily improving. And the coalition to contain Saddam is rickety and in danger of scattering.

Challenges of State-Building in Iraq Dec 21 2022 The book analyses Iraqi Army's reconstruction in the post-Saddam era. Despite an apparent plan and a coalition in charge, the research identified multiple consideration, planning and synchronisation issues. The roles of actors like the United Nations or national governments are isolated and discussed through a unique method.

Thinking about Nuclear Power in Post-Saddam Iraq Dec 09 2021 This monograph provides an overview and analysis of thinking in Iraq on the issue of nuclear power. Nuclear power has long held a special fascination for Iraq, and despite past controversies, this issue continues to draw the attention of numerous influential Iraqis in the post-Saddam era. Informed public opinion in Iraq today is clearly a more important factor for understanding the background of decisionmaking than it was during the Saddam era, so that this monograph addresses the views of all the sectors of Iraqi society likely to have an input into decisionmaking in this arena. There is an emerging Iraqi consensus on the desirability of a peaceful nuclear program, with

arguments supported by the expected benefits for electric power generation, agriculture, and medicine, as well as an eventual transition from oil. National pride is also a motivating factor, as nuclear power is viewed as an indicator of modernity and as proof of being able to keep up with regional neighbors. As for a military application of nuclear power, those expressing a positive view—all outside the current government—see nuclear weapons as an effective political and military instrument and as necessary to balance Israel's nuclear arsenal, although their support is voiced on behalf of "the Arabs" in general rather than using the more sensitive term, Iraq. The belief in the effectiveness of a balance of terror in ensuring security and stability is widespread.

Perceptions about a prospective Iranian nuclear weapon, however, most often break down along confessional lines, with most Shi'a welcoming the prospect as a boost to the Shi'a community's security, while Sunnis continue earlier views of a nuclear-armed Iran as a threat. There is little concern over potential environmental implications or potential accidents, or attention to ethical issues. One should expect in Iraq the same movement toward nuclear power as in the rest of the Middle East, at least in the civilian sector. However, daunting obstacles remain to rebuilding the country's eviscerated nuclear infrastructure, which resulted from the dismantling of many facilities, the removal of fissionable material, and the emigration or death of former nuclear scientists. However, Baghdad has taken steps to reintegrate the country into the nuclear research structure of the Arab world and to end existing restrictive international controls. For example, it has requested that France build a new reactor, and has made an effort to regenerate its

domestic scientific community. There is no indication of any intention to reestablish a military program; any decision to do so in the future would be impossible to predict, given Iraq's evolving domestic political dynamics. It will be difficult for the United States or the international community to ignore or reject outright Iraq's expectations for a nuclear program, given the deeply-felt entitlement throughout Iraq's informed public and in light of the almost universal regional trends. But the United States can help to manage the process of an orderly, safe, and peaceful nuclear reintegration of Iraq in the civilian sector. At the same time, the United States and the international community should ensure that any return to a nuclear program be accompanied by Iraq's acceptance of strict international monitoring and controls to prevent any diversion to the military field or terrorist use. U.S. policymakers and military leaders should also focus on ensuring that any peaceful nuclear program in Iraq be as secure from accidents as possible through training and assistance.

Saudi Security Nov 20 2022

The Death of the Mehdi Army Sep 06 2021 The Mehdi Army militia was a towering force in Iraq during the early years of the post-Saddam era. As an aggressive opponent of foreign occupation and one of the principal antagonists in Iraq's brutal sectarian civil war, the militia was central to the violence that ravaged the country and a pivotal political actor. Growing rapidly in size and strength, and controlling entire districts of Baghdad and broad swathes of southern and central Iraq, the Mehdi Army seemed poised to become a Hezbollah-like 'state within a state' that would remain enormously powerful for years to come. Drawing from extensive field experience in one of

Baghdad's most volatile militia-held districts, Krohley exposes how, and why, the militia suddenly and unexpectedly collapsed in the midst of the Americans' 'Surge' of forces during 2008. Building from an examination of the Mehdi Army's social and ideological roots, he presents a neighbourhood-by-neighbourhood study of the militia's changing fortunes that offers unparalleled local detail and specificity. Krohley shows how the Mehdi Army's demise was ultimately a self-inflicted 'death' as opposed to a triumph of its foes. In so doing, he not only challenges prevailing orthodoxies of counterinsurgency doctrine and the mythology of the Surge, but also offers penetrating insights into the battered state of Iraqi society after decades of dictatorship, privation and war.

Iraq Jun 15 2022 This book is a systematic analysis of the intractable challenges posed by terrorism, sectarianism, corruption and the transition to democracy in the post-Saddam Hussein era in Iraq, and details how they can be overcome. This book is particularly unique because while there are many books on Iraq, most of them are historical accounts and travelogues. The authors of these works, the overwhelming majority of whom are non-Iraqi, agree that Iraq is in a crisis, albeit their explanations for and analyses of the crisis and prescriptions vary and are of variegated qualities.

Sectarianism in Iraq Feb 28 2021 This book links sectarianism in Iraq to the failure of the modern nation-state to resolve tensions between sectarian identities and concepts of unified statehood and uniform citizenry. After a theoretical excursus that recasts the notion of primordial identity as a socially constructed reality, the author sets out to explain the persistence of sectarian affiliations

*in Iraq since its creation following the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. Despite the adoption of homogenizing state policies, the uneven sectarian composition of the ruling elites nurtured feelings of political exclusion among marginalized sectarian groups, the Shicites before 2003 and the Sunnis in the post-2003 period. The book then examines how communal discourses in the educational curriculum provoked masked forms of resistance that sharpened sectarian consciousness. Tracing how the anti-Persian streak in the nation-state's Pan-Arab ideology, which camouflaged anti-Shicism, undermined Iraq's national integration project, *Sectarianism in Iraq* delves into the country's slide from a totalizing Pan-Arab ideology in the pre-2003 period toward the atomistic impulse of the federalist debate in the post-2003 period. Employing extensive fieldwork, this book sheds light on the dynamics of political life in post-Saddam Iraq and is essential reading for Iraqi and Middle East specialists, as well as those interested in understanding the current heightening of sectarian Sunni-Shicite tensions in the Middle East.*

Outlook Iraq Feb 23 2023

After Saddam May 02 2021 This monograph examines prewar planning efforts for the reconstruction of postwar Iraq. It then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003, through June 2004. Finally, it examines civilian efforts at reconstruction, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority and its efforts to rebuild structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services.

Defense Strategy for the Post-Saddam Era Jan 22 2023 The

Brookings Institution has long produced an analysis of America's defense budgets and policies. The war on terror and the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have forced upon this country soaring defense budgets and unprecedented challenges in policymaking. In the newest installment in this tradition, leading foreign policy expert Michael O'Hanlon offers policy recommendations for strengthening the ability of America's military to respond to international crises in a tumultuous world. The United States can, for the foreseeable future, be confident that its armed forces will remain engaged in Iraq, as well as in Afghanistan and other theaters in the war on terror. It will also need to remain involved in deterrence missions in the western Pacific, most notably in Korea and the Taiwan Strait. It will wish to remain engaged in European security, since the capabilities and cohesion of the NATO alliance have important implications for the United States globally. O'Hanlon reviews these priorities, asking tough questions and developing frameworks for answering them: • What military will the United States need in the future? • How much will it cost? • How can the U.S. increase the size of its ground forces without increasing the size of the defense budget? • In an era of apocalyptic terror threats, and at a time of \$400 billion defense budgets and \$400 billion federal budget deficits, how can this country protect its citizens while maintaining fiscal responsibility?

The Kurds and US Foreign Policy Oct 07 2021 This book provides a detailed survey and analysis of US–Kurdish relations and their interaction with domestic, regional and global politics. Using the Kurdish issue to explore the nature of the engagement between international powers and weaker non-state entities, the

author analyses the existence of an interactive US relationship with the Kurds of Iraq. Drawing on governmental archives and interviews with political figures both in Northern Iraq and the United States, the author places the case study within a broader International Relations context. The conceptual framework centres on the inter-relations between actors (both state and non-state) and structures of material and ideational kinds, while the detailed survey and analysis of US–Kurdish relations, in their interaction with domestic, regional and global politics, forms the empirical core of the study. Stressing the intertwining of domestic and foreign policy as part of the same set of dynamics, the case study explains the emergence of the interactive and institutionalized US relationship with the Kurds of Iraq that has brought about the formation, within an Iraqi framework, of an undeclared US official Kurdish policy in the post-Saddam era. Filling a gap in the literature on US–Kurdish relations as well as the broader topic of International Relations, this book will be of great interest to those in the areas of International Relations, Middle Eastern and Kurdish Politics.

Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War Jul 24 2020 The Persian Gulf crisis may well have been the most extensively polled episode in U.S. history as President Bush, his opponents, and even Saddam Hussein appealed to, and tried to influence, public opinion. As well documented as this phenomenon was, it remains largely unexplained. John Mueller provides an account of the complex relationship between American policy and public opinion during the Gulf crisis. Mueller analyzes key issues: the actual shallowness of public support for war; the effect of public opinion on the media (rather than the other way around); the use

and misuse of polls by policy makers; the American popular focus on Hussein's ouster as a central purpose of the War; and the War's short-lived impact on voting. Of particular interest is Mueller's conclusion that Bush succeeded in leading the country to war by increasingly convincing the public that it was inevitable, rather than right or wise. Throughout, Mueller, author of War, Presidents, and Public Opinion, an analysis of public opinion during the Korean and Vietnam wars, places this analysis of the Gulf crisis in a broad political and military context, making comparisons to wars in Panama, Vietnam, Korea, and the Falklands, as well as to World War II and even the War of 1812. The book also collects nearly 300 tables charting public opinion through the Gulf crisis, making Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War an essential reference for anyone interested in recent American politics, foreign policy, public opinion, and survey research.

War and Decision Dec 17 2019 In the years since the attacks of September 11, 2001, journalists, commentators, and others have published accounts of the Bush Administration's war on terrorism. But no senior Pentagon official has offered an inside view of those years, or has challenged the prevailing narrative of that war—until now. Douglas J. Feith, the head of the Pentagon's Policy organization, was a key member of Donald Rumsfeld's inner circle as the Administration weighed how to protect the nation from another 9/11. In War and Decision, he puts readers in the room with President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell, General Tommy Franks, and other key players as the Administration devised its strategy and war plans. Drawing on

thousands of previously undisclosed documents, notes, and other written sources, Feith details how the Administration launched a global effort to attack and disrupt terrorist networks; how it decided to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime; how it came to impose an occupation on Iraq even though it had avoided one in Afghanistan; how some officials postponed or impeded important early steps that could have averted major problems in Iraq's post-Saddam period; and how the Administration's errors in war-related communications undermined the nation's credibility and put U.S. war efforts at risk. Even close followers of reporting on the Iraq war will be surprised at the new information Feith provides—presented here with balance and rigorous attention to detail. Among other revelations, War and Decision demonstrates that the most far-reaching warning of danger in Iraq was produced not by State or by the CIA, but by the Pentagon. It reveals the actual story behind the allegations that the Pentagon wanted to "anoint" Ahmad Chalabi as ruler of Iraq, and what really happened when the Pentagon challenged the CIA's work on the Iraq–al Qaida relationship. It offers the first accurate account of Iraq postwar planning—a topic widely misreported to date. And it presents surprising new portraits of Rumsfeld, Rice, Powell, Richard Armitage, L. Paul Bremer, and others—revealing how differences among them shaped U.S. policy. With its blend of vivid narrative, frank analysis, and elegant writing, War and Decision is like no other book on the Iraq war. It will interest those who have been troubled by conflicting accounts of the planning of the war, frustrated by the lack of firsthand insight into the decision-making process, or skeptical of conventional wisdom about Operation Iraqi Freedom and the global war on

terrorism—efforts the author continues to support.

Chilcot Report Dec 29 2020 All the key findings of the public inquiry into the handling of the 2003 Iraq war by the British government led by Tony Blair. Chaired by Sir John Chilcot, the Iraq Inquiry (known as the 'Chilcot Report') tackled: Saddam Hussein's threat to Britain the legal advice for the invasion intelligence about weapons of mass destruction and planning for a post-conflict Iraq. This 60,000-word executive summary was published in July 2016. Philippe Sands QC wrote in the London Review of Books: 'It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate.' Published under an Open Government Licence, this book aims to make better known the findings of the Iraq Inquiry, which took seven years to complete at a cost of £10 million. The text, headings, footnotes and any emphasis are exactly those of the original document. Contents Introduction Pre-conflict strategy and planning The UK decision to support US military action Why Iraq? Why now? The UK's relationship with the US Decision-making Advice on the legal basis for military action Weapons of mass destruction Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq The post-conflict period Occupation Transition Planning for withdrawal Did the UK achieve its objectives in Iraq? Key findings Lessons Timeline of events REVIEWS The Iraq Inquiry, chaired by Sir John Chilcot and composed of five privy councillors, finally published its report on the morning of 6 July, seven years and 21 days after it was established by Gordon Brown with a remit to look at the run-up to the conflict, the

conflict itself and the reconstruction, so that we can learn lessons. It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate. — Philippe Sands, London Review of Books

A more productive way to think of the Chilcot report is as a tool to help us set agendas for renewed best efforts in creating more effective and accountable statecraft. Chilcot has confirmed that... we still do not have intelligent long-range planning by the armed forces in close and active cooperation with other government agencies, nor an adequate and integrated system for the collection and evaluation of intelligence information, nor do we have the highest possible quality and stature of personnel to lead us through these challenging times. — Derek B. Miller, The Guardian

Although sceptics wondered how much more the very-long-awaited Report of the Iraq Inquiry by a committee chaired by Sir John Chilcot could tell us when it appeared at last in July, it proves to contain a wealth of evidence and acute criticism, the more weighty for its sober tone and for having the imprimatur of the official government publisher. In all, it is a further and devastating indictment not only of Tony Blair personally but of a whole apparatus of state and government, Cabinet, Parliament, armed forces, and, far from least, intelligence agencies. Among its conclusions the report says that there was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein; that the British chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted; that military action was not a last resort... — Geoffrey Wheatcroft, The New York Review of Books

Ideal for any student of politics, diplomacy, or

conflict.

Iraq Nov 08 2021 This book presents a broad history of Iraq, from the earliest times to the present, with particular attention to the emergence of modern Iraq in the twentieth century, the power struggles that led to the rise of Saddam Hussein, and recent events such as the Iran-Iraq war, the 1990-91 Gulf crisis, and the continuing depiction of Iraq as a 'pariah' nation. Detailed information is included, much of it unsympathetic to western propaganda, to encourage a deeper understanding and a deeper ethical perception of the 'Iraq Question'.

Saddam's War Mar 12 2022 Includes detailed and edited transcripts of interviews with General Hamdani as well as a summary of insights as interpreted by the interviewers.

U.S. Middle East Policy and Japan's Interests in the Post-cold War Era Mar 20 2020

Intervention, Ethnic Conflict and State-Building in Iraq Sep 18 2022 External intervention by the U.N. and other actors in ethnic conflicts has interfered with the state-building process in post-colonial states. Rear examines the 1991 uprisings in Iraq and demonstrates how this intervention has contributed to the problems with democratization experienced in the post-Saddam era. This timely work will appeal to scholars of International Relations and Middle East studies, as well as those seeking greater insight into the current conflict in Iraq.

Iraq Feb 11 2022 Contents of this report that was compiled for Congress: (1) History of Weapons Inspections in Iraq; (2) Human Rights/War Crimes Issues; (3) Support for International Terrorism; and (4) Iraq-Kuwait Issues.

Democracy in Iraq Jan 18 2020 This book proposes a significant

reassessment of the history of Iraq, documenting democratic experiences from ancient Mesopotamia through to the US occupation. Such an analysis takes to task claims that the 'West' has a uniquely democratic history and a responsibility to spread democracy across the world. It also reveals that Iraq has a democratic history all of its own, from ancient Middle Eastern assemblies and classical Islamic theology and philosophy, through to the myriad political parties, newspapers and protest movements of more recent times. This book argues that the democratic history of Iraq could serve as a powerful political and discursive tool where the Iraqi people may come to feel a sense of ownership over democracy and take pride in endorsing it. This could go a long way towards mitigating the current conflicts across the nation and in stabilizing and legitimating its troubled democracy. Taking an interdisciplinary approach and referring to some of the most influential critical theorists to question ideological assumptions about democracy and its history, this book is useful to those interested in political and legal history, human rights and democracy.

Iraq after America Apr 20 2020 More than a decade after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, most studies of the Iraq conflict focus on the twin questions of whether the United States should have entered Iraq in 2003 and whether it should have exited in 2011, but few have examined the new Iraqi state and society on its own merits. Iraq after America examines the government and the sectarian and secular factions that have emerged in Iraq since the U.S. invasion of 2003, presenting the interrelations among the various elements in the Iraqi political scene. The book traces the origins of key trends in recent Iraqi history to explain the political

and social forces that produced them, particularly during the intense period of civil war between 2003 and 2009. Along the way, the author looks at some of the most significant players in the new Iraq, explaining how they have risen to prominence and what their aims are. The author identifies the three trends that dominate Iraq's post-U.S. political order: authoritarianism, sectarianism, and Islamist resistance, tracing their origins and showing how they have created a toxic political and social brew, preventing Iraq's political elite from resolving the fundamental roots of conflict that have wracked that country since 2003 and before. He concludes by examining some aspects of the U.S. legacy in Iraq, analyzing what it means for the United States and others that, after more than a decade of conflict, Iraq's communities—and its political class in particular—have not yet found a way to live together in peace.

Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq Aug 17 2022 The Kurdish-inhabited region of northern Iraq has been relatively peaceful and prosperous since the fall of Saddam Hussein. However, the Iraqi Kurds' political autonomy, and territorial and economic demands, have caused friction with P.M. Nuri al-Maliki and other Arab leaders of Iraq, and with Christian and other minorities in the north. Turkey and Iran were skeptical about Kurdish autonomy in Iraq but have reconciled themselves to this reality. Contents of this report: (1) Pre-War Background; (2) Post-Saddam Period/The Kurdistan Regional Gov't. (KRG); (3) Major Issues Between Baghdad and the Kurds: Participation in the Central Gov't. Independence Question; Control Over Oil Resources/Oil Laws: PKK and Other Kurdish Militant Safehaven. The Kurdish Quasi-State Sep 25 2020 Despite ongoing instability

*and underdevelopment in post-Saddam Iraq, some parts of the country have realized relative security and growth. The Kurdish north, once an isolated outpost for the Iraqi army and local militia, has become an internationally recognized autonomous region. In *The Kurdish Quasi-State*, Natali explains the nature of this transformation and how it has influenced the relationship between the Kurdistan region and Iraq's central government. This much-needed scholarship focuses on foreign aid as helping to create and sustain the Kurdish quasi-state. It argues that the generous nature of external assistance to the Kurdistan region over time has given it new forms of legitimacy and leverage in the country. Since 2003 the Kurdistan region has gained representation in the central government and developed commercial, investment, and political ties with regional states and foreign governments. Drawing on extensive field research, Natali explores how this transition has had positive and unintended consequences on Kurdish—state relations. Greater complexity in the regional political economy has demanded new forms of compromise with the central government. The Kurdistan region may have become a distinct political entity that challenges Baghdad; however, the benefits of aid and logic of quasi-statehood ensure that it will remain part of Iraq. Acutely familiar with the nuances of Kurdish politics, society, and culture, Natali has produced a timely and immensely important book for policy makers, scholars, and practitioners interested in the region.*

Cutting the Gordian Knot Jul 16 2022 This project explores the prospects and modalities for achieving a best model form of government for post-Saddam Iraq. This "best model" government must reflect the multi-faceted religiopolitical and cultural fabric

of Iraqi society. The author envisions an adaptive confederal form of government much like that of Canada or Switzerland consociational in construct. A consociational form of government developed for Iraq must combine elements of federal and communitarian structure that ensure majority voice in government while addressing the minority ethnic and religious diversity of the population. This research will define the applicability of this premise which allows for majority rule and protection of minority rights. Religiopolitical situational awareness is imperative if societal consensus is to be achieved during formation of a new government. The advent of post-Saddam era Shia sectarianism is alarming considering the possible consequences and necessitates immediate measures that can appropriately neutralize or counter a potential extremist religio-centric government. Simultaneously accommodating Muslim diversity as well as minority and ethnically diverse religious groups is a significant but corollary hurdle that must be overcome. To derive and explain this best model government the research will incorporate various techniques and methodologies. Primary resources will include my personal dialogue experiences and interaction with significant players on the ground in Iraq during the spring of 2003. Secondary resourcing will incorporate an array of professional data from both academic and journalistic sources. A consociational form of government federated and communitarian in construct decisively applied may well cut the Gordian knot' and lead to a representative and stable form of government constructed by Iraqis, for Iraqis, and led by Iraqis.

Peshmerga 'Those Who Face Death' Nov 15 2019 The Kurds,

although a courageous people, have been, until recently, little known beyond the Kurdish mountains. Before the invasion of northern Iraq by ISIS in 2014 few people in the West knew where Kurdistan was as a country, and even fewer had heard of Peshmerga as a fighting force. This has now changed. With the appearance of ISIS Peshmerga was catapulted onto the world stage as a courageous and capable military force, a main contributor to the downfall of the Islamic State. Despite its significance however, in both Kurdish as well as English, very little has been written about the Kurdish army. Countless works have been published, giving detailed accounts of the social, economic, geographic, political, religious and historical background of Kurdistan, but very little on Peshmerga itself. There is no official history of Peshmerga, no standard work informing the general reader of the development and role of the Kurdish army. This book is an attempt to fill that gap. It is important to stress this book is not a history of the Kurdish people. Instead it is an account - the first account ever written - of the Kurdish fighting spirit which first emerged in the ancient world, and later developed during the Kurd's struggles under Islamic rulers and against later regimes, particularly the Ottoman and British Empires. The central theme of the book is the development of Peshmerga from tribal militias; to a mountain based Guerrilla force which could hold its own often against much larger, and better equipped, Iraqi armies sent against it. This partisan force later became the modern "battlefield", western trained, army of today. This theme is inextricably linked with the Kurdish struggle for independence in the face of ongoing western promises of hope then betrayal and disappointment.

Particular attention is given to the short-lived Kurdish republic in Mahabad, Iran, in 1946 under Qazi Muhammad and the subsequent famous march to Russia by Mulla Mustafa Barzani and the legendary "500" Peshmerga in 1947; the 14 July revolution in 1958; the Iraqi-Kurdish wars of the 1960's and 70's and the defeat of the Kurds (mainly due to American and Iranian betrayal) following the Algiers Accord 1975. The role of Peshmerga in the Iran-Iraq War, and against Saddam Hussein (particularly the brutal Anfal campaign) are discussed in detail. Attention is also given to the significant role of Peshmerga in the two Gulf Wars and the tragedy of the Kurdish civil war in the mid-1990s. The emergence and development of the KDP under Mustafa Barzani and later his son Masoud Barzani, and the PUK under Jalal Talabani (the two dominant political groups in Kurdistan) is an important thread of this Peshmerga story. In the post-Saddam era the book looks at the fight by Peshmerga against the militant Islamic group Ansar al Islam, which gave the Kurds and Iraqis a foretaste, albeit much smaller, of the devastating brutality of the so called Islamic State. An entire chapter is given to women Peshmerga and the significant contribution made by female fighters to the development of Kurdish military capability. The author lived for three years in Kurdistan and Iraq gathering information for this book. Drawing on direct contact with Peshmerga (he interviewed hundreds of Kurdish soldiers from infantrymen to Generals); living with Peshmerga on the front-line, and knowing many of the leading military commanders and Kurdish politicians (both KDP and PUK), the author (as an experienced journalist and academic writer) considers, not only the tumultuous history of Peshmerga, but also its significance,

role and its ongoing needs. As such the author lets Peshmergas speak for themselves and tell their own unique and exciting story.

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